讲座主题：Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule

讲座时间：2024年11月16日 上午8:30-10:00

讲座地点：丽湖校区 四方楼南103

讲座介绍：

A collective choice problem specifies a finite set of alternatives from which a group of expected utility maximizers must choose. We associate a pseudo market with every collective choice problem and establish the existence and efficiency of Lindahl equilibrium allocations for that market. We also associate a cooperative bargaining problem with every collective choice problem and define a set-valued solution concept, the ω-weighted Nash bargaining set where ω is a vector of welfare weights. We provide axioms that characterize the ω-weighted Nash bargaining set. Our main result shows that ω-weighted Nash bargaining set payoffs are also the Lindahl equilibrium payoffs of the corresponding collective pseudo market with the same utility functions and incomes ω. We define an appropriate notion of the core (the pseudo core) for collective pseudo markets and show that Lindahl equilibria are in the pseudo core. We apply collective pseudo markets to a stylized public goods problem and compare the properties of Walras and Lindahl equilibrium discrete allocation problems and in matching problems.